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PUTTING THE RABBIT BACK IN THE HAT:
NOEL CANNING’S IMPACT ON EIGHTEEN
MONTHS OF NLRB DECISIONS AND FUTURE
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
Paul Kind∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning1 interpreted the
Recess Appointments Clause (alternatively, “Clause”)2 for the first
time in history.3 In so doing, the Court invalidated hundreds of
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the “Board”) decisions
from 2012 and 2013 and set the standard for future presidential
appointments of officials. This Comment focuses on the impact of
Noel Canning on (1) the invalidated NLRB decisions and (2) future
presidential nominations.
The Noel Canning opinion centered around whether President
Obama had constitutionally applied the Recess Appointments Clause
in appointing three of five NLRB members in January 2012. The
Court ultimately held that the members had been unconstitutionally
appointed because the recess had not been long enough to trigger the
Clause.4
The controversy at issue stemmed from a somewhat routine
dispute between an employer and a union. The dispute resulted in a
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Religion &
Philosophy, Indiana Wesleyan University, 2004. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their fine work. I am also extremely grateful to Professors
Aimee Dudovitz and Georgene Vairo for their academic guidance and personal encouragement
throughout my years in law school. Finally, deep gratitude goes to my wife, Brooke. A single
sentence could not convey my appreciation for her support, inspiration, and faithfulness.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
2. The Recess Appointments Clause states that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up
all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which
shall expire at the End of their next Session.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 3.
3. The Court stated, “We have not previously interpreted the [Recess Appointments]
Clause . . . .” Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560.
4. See id. at 2557.
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decision by the NLRB in favor of the union.5 The employer then
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, arguing that the NLRB decision should be thrown out
because three of the five members had been unconstitutionally
appointed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the employer and
invalidated the NLRB decision.6
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Court of Appeals
decision holding that the appointments had been unconstitutional.
However, the Court was sharply divided between a five-Justice
majority, authored by Justice Breyer, and a four-Justice concurrence,
vehemently authored by Justice Scalia.7 The two opinions disagree
on everything except the final judgment. Further, the majority
opinion overturned the rationale of the Court of Appeals decision in
its entirety and upheld only the end result.
This Comment unpacks the Noel Canning opinion’s reasoning
before delving into the opinion’s impact on the invalidated NLRB
decisions and future presidential appointments. Part II lays out the
facts discussed in the opinion. Part III takes an in-depth look at the
Court’s reasoning. Finally, Part IV analyzes the impact of Noel
Canning on the invalidated NLRB decisions and future presidential
appointments.
II. NOEL CANNING: THE FACTS
On September 26, 2011, an NLRB administrative law judge
(ALJ) ruled in favor of Teamsters Local 760 (“the Union”) and
against Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of PepsiCola products
and a division of the Noel Corporation.8 Specifically, the ALJ held
that Noel Canning had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act by refusing to execute and enter into a collective
5. See Noel Canning, A Div. of the Noel Corp. & Teamsters Local 760, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4
(Feb. 8, 2012).
6. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
2861 (2013), and aff’d but criticized, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
7. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court’s decision
transforms the recess-appointment power from a tool carefully designed to fill a narrow and
specific need into a weapon to be wielded by future Presidents against future Senates. To reach
that result, the majority casts aside the plain, original meaning of the constitutional text in
deference to late-arising historical practices that are ambiguous at best. The majority’s insistence
on deferring to the Executive’s untenably broad interpretation of the power is in clear conflict
with our precedent and forebodes a diminution of this Court’s role in controversies involving the
separation of powers and the structure of government. I concur in the judgment only.”).
8. Noel Canning, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4 at *1.
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bargaining agreement that had been verbally agreed to by the parties
during negotiations.9 Noel Canning appealed the decision, and on
February 8, 2012, the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision.10 As a
result, the NLRB “ordered the distributor to execute the agreement
and to make employees whole for any losses.”11
Subsequently, Noel Canning appealed the NLRB’s decision to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.12 Noel
Canning argued that the NLRB’s decision should be set aside
because three of the five Board members had been invalidly
appointed.13
On January 4, 2012, the President appointed three NLRB
members—Sharon Block, Richard Griffin, and Terence Flynn—by
invoking the Recess Appointments Clause, thus bypassing a Senate
vote.14 At that time, the Senate had taken a series of brief recesses
from December 17, 2011, until January 23, 2012.15 According to a
Senate resolution, the Senate held pro forma sessions every Tuesday
and Friday during this period.16 Noel Canning argued that the Recess
Appointments Clause did not support appointments that were made
while the Senate was in a three-day adjournment that occurred
between pro forma sessions on January 3 and 6, 2012.17
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Noel Canning but not for
the reason that Noel Canning had argued.18 The Court of Appeals
held that the appointments had been unconstitutional because they
had been made during an intra-session recess (a recess within a
formal session of Congress) rather than an inter-session recess (a
recess between formal sessions of Congress).19 Because the second
session of the 112th Congress had begun one day before the
9. Id. at *3, *8.
10. Id. at *1.
11. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Pro forma sessions are often only seconds-long and have been used by the Senate to
stifle a President’s ability to make recess appointments by breaking a longer recess into several
shorter adjournments. See Alexander M. Wolf, Taking Back What’s Theirs: The Recess
Appointments Clause, Pro Forma Sessions, and A Political Tug-of-War, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2055, 2059, 2067 (2013).
17. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2557–58.
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appointments, the appointments occurred during an intra-session
recess and not an inter-session recess.20 Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals stated that the appointments were unconstitutional because
the Recess Appointments Clause applies only to vacancies that arise
during the recess.21 In this instance, the vacancies had occurred well
before the recess.22 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals deemed the
NLRB’s decision to be invalid because the NLRB had not had a
properly appointed quorum of members.23
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted the Solicitor General’s
petition for certiorari on behalf of the government.24
III. NOEL CANNING: THE COURT’S REASONING
The Supreme Court addressed three issues in determining the
constitutionality of the President’s appointments: (1) whether the
phrase “recess of the Senate” refers only to an inter-session recess, or
also includes an intra-session recess; (2) whether the phrase
“vacancies that may happen” refers only to vacancies that first come
into existence during a recess, or also includes vacancies that arise
prior to a recess but exist during the recess; and (3) whether pro
forma sessions should be ignored in calculating the recess’s length.25
A. Does the Recess Appointments Clause
Apply to Both Inter- and Intra-Session Recesses?
First, on the issue of whether the Recess Appointments Clause
includes both inter- and intra-session recesses, the Court disagreed
with the Court of Appeals and held that the Clause does apply to
both types of recesses.26 The Court of Appeals’ narrow interpretation
of the Clause limited recess appointments to the inter-session recess,
the annual recess between formal sessions of Congress.27 Contrary to
the Court of Appeals,28 the Supreme Court determined that the
Clause also applies to intra-session recesses of sufficient length.29
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 2558.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2556–57.
Id. at 2567.
Id. at 2557–58.
Id. at 2557, 2561.
Id. at 2561.
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The Court determined this by first looking to the Constitution’s
text. After surveying founding-era dictionaries and remarks by the
Founders, the Court found that the word “recess” applies to either
type of recess.31 Further, the word “the”—which precedes “recess” in
the Clause—may refer to either a particular recess (e.g., the
inter-session recess) or recesses generally and universally.32 Thus,
the Court found that the Constitution’s text is ambiguous as to this
question.33
Next, the Court looked to the Clause’s purpose: giving “the
President authority to make appointments during ‘the recess of the
Senate’ so that the President can ensure the continued functioning of
the Federal Government when the Senate is away.”34 Because the
Senate is away during both an inter-session recess and an
intra-session recess, the Court held that the Clause should apply to
both.35
Finally, the Court looked to historical precedent,36 noting both
that intra-session recesses have been longer and more frequent since
192937 and that Presidents have consistently interpreted the word
“recess” to apply to both inter- and intra-session recesses.38
Accordingly, the Court stated that “three-quarters of a century of
settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in
a proper interpretation’ of the constitutional provision.”39 In addition,
the Court noted that the Senate has not called into question the
broader understanding of “recess,” despite Presidents making
“countless recess appointments during intra-session recesses.”40
The Court again turned to historical practice to determine the
length of an intra-session recess that would trigger the Recess
Appointments Clause.41 To begin with, all parties concerned agreed
that a recess must be at least three days in length for the Recess
30

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2562.
Id.
Id. at 2564.
Id. (citing Okanogan v. United States, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)).
Id.
Id. at 2566.
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Appointments Clause to apply.42 This conclusion stemmed from the
Constitution’s Adjournments Clause, which provides: “Neither
House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of
the other, adjourn for more than three days.”43 Accordingly, a Senate
recess that does not require the House of Representatives’ consent is
not long enough to make the Recess Appointments Clause
applicable.44 However, the Court found no record of there ever
having been an intra-session recess appointment when the recess was
shorter than ten days.45 The weight of historical practice pushed the
Court to conclude “that a recess of more than three days but less than
ten days is presumptively too short to fall within the Clause.”46
In sum, the Recess Appointments Clause applies to both types of
recesses, so long as the recess is at least ten days in length.47
B. Is the Recess Appointments Clause Limited to
Vacancies That Come Open During the Recess?
Once again, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of
Appeals, holding that the Recess Appointments Clause applies to
recesses that come open before or during the recess.48 The Court
again looked to the Constitutional text, the Clause’s purpose, and
historical practice in making this determination.
First, the Court found that the Clause’s text is ambiguous.49 A
narrower reading would be to hold that “vacancies that may happen”
must be interpreted as vacancies that originate during the Senate
recess.50 The Court found such a narrow reading to be implausible,
especially considering both Thomas Jefferson and William Wirt,
President James Monroe’s Attorney General, discussed two possible
constructions of the Clause.51

42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
44. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2566.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2567 (“We add the word ‘presumptively’ to leave open the possibility that some
very unusual circumstance—a national catastrophe, for instance, that renders the Senate
unavailable but calls for an urgent response—could demand the exercise of the recessappointment power during a shorter break.”).
47. Exceptions may apply as mentioned in note 46, supra.
48. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567.
49. Id. at 2568.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2567–68.
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Second, the Court stated that the Clause’s purpose—allowing
the President to appoint officers when the Senate is not available to
confirm them—favored applying the Clause to vacancies that had
arisen before the recess.52 The Court determined that the Recess
Appointments Clause’s purpose was to foster the government’s
ongoing operation, and a narrow reading of the Clause would
impinge on that purpose.53 Specifically, a narrow reading would keep
the President from appointing an officer in certain circumstances “no
matter who the official, no matter how dire the need, no matter how
uncontroversial the appointment, and no matter how late in the
session the office fell vacant.”54
Third, in looking at historical practice, the Court found that the
broader interpretation of the Clause has been strongly favored.55
Every President since James Buchanan (1857–61) has made recess
appointments to vacancies that existed prior to the recess, and many
of the Presidents prior to Buchanan did likewise.56 Although
historical data on when vacancies arose is incomplete, “a large
proportion of the recess appointments in the history of the Nation
have filled pre-existing vacancies.”57 In addition, the Senate has
largely not contested the practice, and it has been entirely
uncontested for approximately seventy-five years.58
In sum, the ambiguity of the Clause’s text, the Clause’s purpose,
and the historical application of the Clause led to the conclusion that
“all vacancies” includes vacancies that become open prior to a
recess.59
C. Do Pro Forma Sessions Count as Senate Sessions?
Having interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause, the
remaining question is: How long was the intra-session recess in
which President Obama appointed the three NLRB members?60 The
Solicitor General posited that the recess had been twenty days in

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 2568–69.
See id.
Id. at 2569–70.
Id. at 2570.
Id. at 2571.
Id.
Id. at 2573.
Id.
Id. at 2573.
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length—from January 3, when the second session of the 112th
Congress technically began, to January 23, when the Senate had
reconvened for regular business.61 The Solicitor General argued that
the five pro forma sessions held between January 3 and January 23
should be disregarded because the Senate had been functionally on
recess the entire time.62 Alternatively, if pro forma sessions count as
Senate sessions, then the appointments had been made during a
three-day recess between pro forma sessions.63
The Court held that pro forma sessions count as sessions
because during them the Senate maintains the capacity to transact
business.64 Central to the Court’s determination was that the Senate
has the right to determine when the Senate is in session.65 Both the
Constitution’s structure and the Court’s precedents reflected the
Senate’s ability to set its own rules and control its own schedule.66
However, the Court looked to the Recess Appointments
Clause’s purpose in identifying one caveat: the Senate must have the
ability to conduct business.67 Otherwise it would be meaningless for
the Senate to say it is in session in name only.68
By this standard, the Court determined that the pro forma
sessions were in fact sessions and not a functional recess.69 The
Court came to this conclusion for several reasons. First, the Senate
had declared that it was in session.70 Second, the Senate had in fact
maintained the ability to conduct business.71 For example, just weeks
before the Presidential appointments of the NLRB members, the
Senate had passed a bill by unanimous consent during a pro forma
session.72 Accordingly, the Court refused to engage in the Solicitor
General’s request for a “more realistic appraisal of what the Senate
actually did.”73 To hold that the pro forma sessions were actual
sessions of the Senate and not a form of recess, it was sufficient that
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 2574.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2574–75.
Id. at 2575.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2576.
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the Senate had declared itself in session and had maintained the
capacity to conduct business.74
In sum, the President had appointed the NLRB members during
a three-day recess, which is too short of a recess to trigger the Recess
Appointments Clause.75 The Court, therefore, affirmed the Court of
Appeals’ judgment but under a completely different rationale.76
Whereas the Court of Appeals had held that the Clause applies only
to inter-session recesses and only to vacancies that come open during
the recess, the Supreme Court held that the Clause applies to both
inter- and intra-session recesses and to all vacancies regardless of
when they arise.
IV. ANALYSIS
Much could be said about the divergent approaches to
constitutional interpretation exhibited by the majority and concurring
opinions.77 However, this Comment is focused on the Noel Canning
opinion’s impact on the hundreds of NLRB decisions made during
the invalidated members’ tenure, as well as the opinion’s impact on
future recess appointments. Accordingly, the concurring opinion is
not discussed because it lacks precedential authority.
A. Impact of Noel Canning on the NLRB Decisions
Made by the Invalid Board Members
As a result of Noel Canning, all of the NLRB decisions that
were decided by the improperly appointed members are invalid and
must be reheard by the current Board. This covers the
eighteen-month period from January 4, 2012, when the President
appointed the three members via the Recess Appointments Clause, to
July 30, 2013, when the Senate confirmed all five Board members.78
Early reports suggested 400 to 600 cases needed rehearing.79
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2574.
76. Id. at 2578.
77. See id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78. Ramsey Cox, Senate Confirms All 5 NLRB Members, THE HILL (July 30, 2013),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/314503-senate-votes-to-confirm-all-five-nlrb
-members. To find consensus in the Senate for the confirmation of five NLRB members, the
nominations of the invalidly appointed members were withdrawn, and two of the five members
confirmed were selected by the Republican Party. Id.
79. Benjamin Goad, Workload Threatens to Paralyze Labor Board, THE HILL (July 13,
2014),
http://thehill.com/regulation/labor/212031-new-workload-threatens-to-paralyze-obama
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However, NLRB spokesperson Tony Wagner said the Board had
identified approximately 100 decisions that will be reviewed.80
Because the five-member NLRB regularly delegates its
decision-making authority to three-member subsets of the Board,
only the decisions that had been decided by the invalidated members
must be reheard.81 Further, many other disputes have subsequently
been resolved, and the parties will not press for rehearing.82 Dozens
of NLRB decisions from this time period have been challenged in
federal court, and these will likely be remanded to the Board for
reconsideration.83
The method that the NLRB will use to rehear the decisions is
unclear. The day Noel Canning was published, the NLRB Chairman
released a statement that said the NLRB was “analyzing the impact
that the Court’s decision has on Board cases,” and that the NLRB “is
committed to resolving any cases affected by today’s decision as
expeditiously as possible.”84 Although some commentators suggest
that rehearing the decisions will result in little change,85 many
-labor-board (stating that more than 400 cases were initially thought to require rehearing);
Richard Meneghello, A Series of Ticking Time Bombs—A Review of the Supreme Court’s 2013–
2014 Term, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-series
-of-ticking-time-bombs-a-revie-02866/ (stating that more than 600 cases were invalidated and
thought to require rehearing).
80. Goad, supra note 79.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Anne Averitt & Matthew C. Lonergan, Supreme Court Opinion Calls Into Question
Hundreds of NLRB Rulings, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com
/legalnews/supreme-court-opinion-calls-into-questio-27774/; see, e.g., Nestle Dreyer’s Ice Cream
Co. v. NLRB, No. 12-1684 (4th Cir. July 29, 2014) (“The court vacates the Board’s order and
remands the case to the Board for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in NLRB v. Noel Canning . . . .”), available at http://www.chamberlitigation.com/nestle-dreyers
-ice-cream-company-v-nlrb-et-al (select PDF link for Order Vacating and Remanding to NLRB—
Nestle Dreyer’s Ice Cream Company v. NLRB, et al.).
84. Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement of NLRB Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce on the
Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD (June 26, 2014),
http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/statement-nlrb-chairman-mark-gaston-pearce
-supreme-courts-noel-canning; see also Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB Officials Ratify Agency
Actions Taken During Period When Supreme Court Held Board Members Were Not Validly
Appointed, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news
-story/nlrb-officials-ratify-agency-actions-taken-during-period-when-supreme-court (stating that
the NLRB “ratified all administrative, personnel, and procurement matters taken by the Board”
during the invalidated period).
85. Henry W. Sledz, Jr., Supreme Court Affirms Noel Canning Decision, Invalidates
President Obama’s January 2012 Recess Appointments to the NLRB, NAT’L L. REV. (July 4,
2014),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-affirms-noel-canning-decision
-invalidates-president-obama-s-january-20 (“Given the Democratic majority on the Board, we
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commentators contend that rehearing will be more favorable for
employers than workers.86
There are at least three reasons for a potential employer-friendly
outcome as a result of Noel Canning. First, the NLRB decisions
during the eighteen-month invalidated time period were generally
worker-friendly.87 Therefore, it is possible that on rehearing
employers may be more pleased with the outcome. For example, the
noteworthy NLRB decision, Banner Health System,88 struck down an
employer’s policy that workers could not discuss “ongoing
investigations of employee misconduct.”89 The NLRB held that “an
employer’s interest in maintaining an internal investigation’s
integrity did not outweigh the potential restrictions the policy
imposed on an employee’s right to concerted action.”90 This ruling,
were it to stand, impacts all private-sector employers, not just union
employers.91 Employers will be eager to see if Banner Health
System, and other notable decisions, will have more favorable
outcomes for their interests. The Board’s changed composition could
lead to a different result the second time around.
Second, reviewing approximately 100 decisions will likely
hamper the NLRB for several months.92 This is thought to be
employer-friendly due to the current worker-friendly nature of the
Board. Several potentially precedent-setting cases are presently
before the Board, including the following: “the Northwestern
University football team’s unionization bid, the right of employees to
use work email to organize a union, the board’s proposed rule
anticipate that many of the invalid prior decisions will be reaffirmed by the Board . . . .”); Goad,
supra note 79 (“Given the board’s political and ideological makeup, the decisions are not likely to
change much a second time around.”).
86. See Meneghello, supra note 79; Tanja L. Thompson & Brenda N. Canale, Supreme
Court
Holds
NLRB
Recess
Appointments
Invalid,
HR
PROF.
MAG.,
http://hrprofessionalsmagazine.com/supreme-court-holds-nlrb-recess-appointments-invalid/ (last
visited Oct. 24, 2014).
87. What Should Workers and Employers Expect Next from the National Labor Relations
Board?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Health, Emp’t, Labor, and Pensions, 113th Cong.
8 (2014) (statement of G. Roger King, Of Counsel, Jones Day), available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/king_testimony_revised.pdf (arguing that the
invalidated Board was extremely worker-friendly and that the Board “is engaged in an agenda
that clearly goes considerably beyond moderate policy oscillation”).
88. 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (July 30, 2012).
89. Id. at *2.
90. Averitt & Lonergan, supra note 83.
91. Id.
92. Goad, supra note 79.
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allowing for speedier union elections and a decision that could
change the very definition of who counts as an employer for the
purpose of labor rules.”93 If, as some have posited, the current Board
members have a pro-worker agenda, then they will have a difficult
time carrying that out in cases that have yet to be decided because of
the burden of rehearing around 100 cases.94
Third, an additional change in the Board’s makeup occurred in
December 2014. Nancy Schiffer, one of the three Democratic
members on the Board, had her term expire on December 16, 2014,
and Lauren McFerran was appointed shortly thereafter. Largely
regarded as a pro-worker addition to the Board, her presence could
lead to many of the invalidated pro-worker decisions ultimately
being upheld. However, this remains to be seen. Either way, it is
possible that things could move in an employer-friendly direction
when the cases are reheard.
In sum, the potential for new decisions regarding notable cases,
the backlog created by rehearing approximately 100 cases, and the
recent shakeup of the Board make Noel Canning a welcome opinion
among the employer-friendly crowd.
B. Impact of Noel Canning on Future Recess Appointments
Noel Canning’s impact on future recess appointments cuts two
ways. On the one hand, the Court’s broad interpretation of “recess”
and “vacancies that may happen” means that recess appointments are
constitutional at all times, so long as the recess is of sufficient length.
On the other hand, weighing against future recess appointments, the
Court’s determination that pro forma sessions count as Senate
sessions means that the Senate can use this tactic to block future
recess appointments. Given the newly established interpretation of
the Recess Appointments Clause, the following analysis provides an
overview of how Presidential appointments can and cannot occur
moving forward.
The need for and likelihood of recess appointments depends on
which party controls the two Houses of Congress. First, if the
members of the President’s own political party control the Senate,
then recess appointments will likely not be an issue because of recent

93. Id.
94. See Meneghello, supra note 79.
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changes to Senate rules.95 Until recently, the Senate required a
supermajority of sixty Senators to support a Presidential nomination
in order to avoid a filibuster by the opposing party.96 However, in
November 2013, in a 52-to-48 vote, the Democrat-controlled Senate
voted to do away with filibusters for all Presidential nominations,
with the exception of Supreme Court nominations.97 Now, a simple
majority is all that is needed to ensure confirmation of a President’s
nominee.98 This rule change upended nearly forty years of requiring
a supermajority for nominations.99 Consequently, the President will
have little to no reason to resort to using recess appointments if his or
her party controls the Senate.
Second, if the President’s political party controls the House, but
not the Senate, that party will have the option of demanding
adjournment on a certain date and creating a recess. The Constitution
makes it clear that the two Houses of Congress must be in agreement
when they adjourn for more than three days.100 If the Senate were to
oppose, then the President has the Constitutional authority to set the
adjournment date of both Houses of Congress.101 The Constitution
states, “in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the
Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall
think proper.”102 As the Court in Noel Canning stated, this allows the
President to essentially “force a recess.”103 Practically, this means
that if members of the President’s political party control the House
but not the Senate, then that party can use the rules outlined in the
Constitution to create a recess of sufficient length for the Recess
Appointments Clause to apply.
Third, if the President’s political party does not control either
House of Congress, then the President will be unlikely to appoint
95. See Peter Shane, Two Cheers for Recess Appointments, PENN PROGRAM ON REG.
REGBLOG
(June 26,
2014),
http://www.regblog.org/2014/06/26-shane-two-cheers-recess
-appointments.html.
96. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised
-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21
/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
101. Id. art. II, § 3.
102. Id.
103. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577 (2014).
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government officials unless they are amenable to the opposing party.
In this scenario, the President would have no guaranteed method of
having nominations confirmed or of creating recesses of sufficient
length for the Recess Appointments Clause to apply.104 For example,
President Clinton, a Democrat, began his presidency with Democrats
in control of both Houses of Congress.105 However, Republicans
took control of both Houses at the first mid-term election and
remained in control for the remaining six years of Clinton’s
presidency.106 If this scenario occurred again, because the Senate
would be free to set its own schedule, the Senate would have the
option of scheduling business sessions or pro forma sessions to the
extent needed to negate the President’s ability to appoint officials
under the Clause.107 Accordingly, the President would have to resort
to bipartisan cooperation to attain his or her nominees’
confirmations.108
Because the Supreme Court gave great weight to historical
practice, the tools available to the President for nominations of
officers are largely the same as they were before Noel Canning. As a
result of Noel Canning, however, all parties involved know what the
rules are and what the extent of the President’s authority is under the
Recess Appointments Clause.

104. Shane, supra note 95.
105. See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives: 1798–Present, HISTORY, ART &
ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party
-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ [hereinafter House Party Divisions] (last visited Oct. 25, 2014); Party
Division in the Senate 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm
[hereinafter Senate Party Division] (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
106. House Party Divisions, supra note 105; Senate Party Division, supra note 105.
107. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577.
108. The Vacancies Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349 (2012), provides the rules for the President’s
ability to designate acting officers for certain periods of time. See The Vacancies Act, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE ARCHIVE, http://www.justice.gov/archive/transition/vacancies-act.htm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2014).

